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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE PRIDE CLUB, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
12066

THE STATE OF UTAH, et al., )
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action instigated
against the State of Utah to have certain sections of
the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969 and the Private
Nonprofit Locker Clubs Act of 1969 declared unconstitutional.
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DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
On March 17, 1970, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson,
Judge, District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint.
RELIEF SOUGlIT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the summary judgment against them and a determination that§§ 16-6-13.1,
16-6-13.5, and 16-6-13.7 Utah Code Ann. 1969, and
all interrelated sections of the Private Nonprofit Locker
Clubs Act of 1969 an,d the Liquor Control Act of 1969,
are unconstitutional and, therefore, void.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants instituted this declaratory judgment
action against the respondents to have certain sections
of the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969 and the Private
Nonprofit Locker Clubs Act of 1969 declared unconstitutional, and to have the respondents enjoined from
enforcing these sections. The respondents contended
that these sections were not unconstitutional and moved
the court for a summary judgment dismissing the
action. Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granted the
respondents' motion. Appellants now appeal the summary judgment against them.

2
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
VIOLATES THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY
THE F 0 UR TH
AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION THAT PEOPLE SHALL BE
SAFE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES.
~

16-6-13.7 UTAH CODE ANN.

alia:

(1969)

§ 16-6-13.7 Utah Code Ann. (1969) provides, inter

( 9) ... Any member of the council, the commission or any peace officer or investigator or examiner authorized by the commission, the council
or the director of the liquor division of the department of public safety, shall, upon presentation of his credentials, be admitted immediately
to the clubhouse or club quarters and permitted
without hindrance or delay, to inspect completely the entire clubhouse, club quarters, and
all books and records of the licensee, at any time
during which the same are open for .the transaction of business to its members, and each member utilizing, or claiming the right to utilize, a
locker as provided in subdivision ( 18) of this
section, shall be deemed to agree and consent to
permit any such person to be admitted and to
inspect the contents of his locker.

The above statute compels all incorporated private
nonprofit liquor locker clubs of Utah to waive the necessity of a search warrant and permit inspections of their
premises, all their books and records, and the private
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lockers of their members whenever any "member of
the council, the commission or any peace officer or investigator or examiner authorized by the commission,
the council or the director of the liquor division" decides to make such a search. The practical effect of
this system is to leave the occupant subject to the whimsical discretion of the official in the field, and this is
precisely the discretion to invade private property that
the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523,' 532-33
(1967).

The United States Supreme Court has been very
active in striking down legislation that allows such warrantless searches. In Camara v. Municipal Courl, supra,
the Court invalidated an ordinance that permitted
warrantless searches by department of public health
inspectors. The Court emphasized its distaste for such
searches because it chose to overrule its ear lier decision in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959) while
being fully aware that it could invalidate this legislation
and let Frank stand. The Frank case upheld a war·
rantless search by a health inspector because the ordinance required that the inspector "have cause to suspect
that a nuisance exists." The ordinance in Camara, however, had no such requirement for cause. Justice White,
in speaking for the majority, was aware of this and
also that both the Camara and Frank ordinances
only al1;owed "reasonalble inspections." (See 387
U. S. at 529, 531, & n. 4.) The Supreme Court, how·
ever, chose to overrule Frank, even though it was

4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not necessary to do so, and declared these warrantless
inspections unconstitutional.
In the instant case, the state argued in the lower
court that the warrant process could not function effectively in this field and, therefore, warrants should not
be required. The same argument was proposed in the
Camara case and led the Supreme Court to state:
In our opinion, these arguments unduly discdunt the purposes behind the warrant machinery contemplated by the Fourth Amendment ...
These are questions which may be reviewed by
a neutral magistrate without any reassessment
of the basic agency decision to canvass an area
.... The practical effect of this system is to leave
the occupant subject to the discretion of the
official in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have
consistently circumscribed by a requirement that
a disinterested party warrant the need to search.
387 U. S. at 532-33.
In See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the
Supreme Court applied the Camara rule to laws permitting warrantless searches of private commercial structures. See involved an ordinance that allowed the fire
chief to enter all buildings and premises, except dwellings, as often as necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable
to cause a fire. In holding that this law was just as
noxious as the one in Ca mara, the Court said:
The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his

5
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business free from unreasonable official entries
upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy
if the decision to enter and inspect for violation
of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by
the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant. 387 U. S. at 543.
In this regard, the nature of private social clubs
in Utah becomes important. Such a club is a nonprofit
association of various citizens who have some common
interest. In many instances that common interest may
be no more than a desire to have a place in which members may entertain their friends or business associates
without resort to permitting consumption of intoxicating liquor in the presence of the children in their homes.
Clearly, many, if not all, private club members look
upon their club as an extension of their living room,
family room, or recreation room. How much more private these clubs are than the commercial warehouse
involved in the See easel If a warrantless search of a
commercial warehouse by a fire chief looking for fire
hazards is an unreasonable invasion of a person's privacy, how can one seriously argue that a warrantless
search of a private club by police officers looking for
criminal violations is not? Yet, this is what the state
proposes.
Shortly after the United States Supreme Court
decided the Camara and See cases, the Utah Supreme
Court decided a case directly in point with this one,
and it is controlling here. In VagabondClub v. Salt Lake
City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P. 2d 691 (1968), a Salt
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Lake City ordinance which allowed the police to do
the very same thing that section 16-6-13.7 allows enforcement officers to do was declared unconstitutional
because it violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The relevant
provisions of that ordinance were § 20-29-20 and § 2029-7 which provided:
§ 20-29-20:

Any peace officer shall have the right to enter
the club room, meeting rooms, premises and facilities of non-profit clubs for the purpose of determining whether any laws or ordinances are being
violated therein and in the case of clubs holding
Class "B" or Class "C" licenses, the police department shall make periodic inspections of said
premises and report its findings to the Board of
Commissioners.
§ 20-29-7:

If the association allows the consumption of beer
or liquor on the premises and the entrance to the
premises is by key or other device, such a key
or device must be supplied to the chief of police.
In this case the Utah Supreme Court held:
In the instant action, the provisions of the ordinance which compel the clubs to provide a key
to the police, permit inspections for violations
of the law and waive the necessity of a warrant,
proscribe the safeguards of the Fourth and
I'"ourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of
the United States and are therefore unconstitutional.
7
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It is most enlightening to compare the above unconstitutional ordinances with the instant statute, which
provides that any peace officer or otherwise authorized
investigator shall be admitted immediately and permitted without hindrance or delay to inspect completely
the entire premises, all books and records, and all contents of the members' individual lockers. Indeed, such
a search infringes more upon one's privacy and is more
unreasonable than the search authorized by the unconstitutional Salt Lake City ordinances.
The respondents tried to distinguish Vagabond
Club v. Salt Lake City from the instant case because
the city ordinances required a key be given the chief
of police if a key were the normal means of the members' entrance into the club. However, since this case
was argued in the lower court, this court has decided
a case that totally emasculates this argument. In Salt
Lake City v. Wheeler, et al., No. 11855, March 25,
1970, the police without a warrant made a search of a
tavern pursuant to an ordinance which provided that
" [ t }he police department shall be permitted to and
have access to all premises licensed or applying for
license under this chapter, and shall make periodic
inspections of said premises and report its findings to
the board of commissioners." In striking down this ordinance, Justice Henriod, speaking for the majority of
this court, said:
Another might answer that what with the restricted number of licenses issued and the comparative ease of obtaining a search warrant
8
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where an establishment may be suspect, what is
wrong or onerous about requiring such a warrant? It would seem that enlightened peace officers would prefer such procedure in order to
innoculate themselves against possible nuisance
litigation.
Withal that is said above, we believe and conclude that our own recent decision in Vagabond
Club v. Salt Lake City is dispositive of the instant case. There the city ordinance required
that the proprietor furnish a key to the police
department for the purpose of entering and "inspecting" the premises. We concluded that it
was offensive to the Fourth Amendment, citing
with approval Camara v. Municipal Court, and
See v. Seattle, which struck down similar legislation presuming to permit warrantless "inspections." The only substantial difference between
the Vagabond case and this case, is that in the
former the proprietor was required to furnish the
police with a key to unlock the door at any tim~
from the outside, while in the instant case the
ordinance requires the proprietor to unlock the
door at any time from the inside, - all to accomplish the same objective-a look-see of all
the premises. We are not constrained to overrule
the Vagabond case.
The same warrantless "look-see" of all the premises
is the objective of the instant statute and the precedent
of Vagabond and Salt Lake City dictates their uncon·
stitutionality.
Also, in the lower court in the instant case, the
respondents tried to cloud the search and seize issue
with an extensive discussion of the old "privilege versus

9
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right" semantic problem. (For a criticism of the usefulness of this doctrine see: Van Alstyne, The Demise

of the Privilege-Right Distinction in Coristitutional

Law. 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 ( 1968). Basically, the respondents contended that they are granting free citizens the privilege of organizing a social club and maintaining rooms for that social club, and that those free
citizens niust sacrifice the constitutional right against
an unreasonable search and seizure for that privilege. This is exactly the same argument that Salt
Lake City proposed and this court rejected in Vagabond Club v. Salt Lake City, supra, (see Points IV
and V of their brief). Of course, one may contract
away or waive a constitutional right, but this presup·
poses a freedom of bargaining. Here the respondents
are coercing the appellants to give up their constitu·
tional rights in an all or nothing agreement. This is
at best an unconscionable bargain in a contract of
adhesion and obviously not a voluntary waiver of a con·
stitutional right.
In support of their contention, the respondents
argued that since one could consent to a self-incrimi·
nating blood test for the privilege of a driver's license,
he could consent to an unreasonable search to obtain
liquor privileges. Ignoring the fact that the situation
of drinking and driving makes this distinguishable, it
is important to note that the cases cited by the state
(State v. Bryan, 16 Utah 2d 47, 395 P. 2d 539 (1964);
State v. Robinson, 23 Utah 2d 78, 457 P. 2d 969
(1969)) do not support this point. In Bryan the ap·

1-0
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pellant gave an actual, not implicit, consent at the time
the test was given, and Robinson was dismissed on
procedural grounds. The Utah Supreme Court has not
ruled on the constitutionality of "implied consent" to
a blood test and the validity of any other courts holding
it constitutional is presently in doubt since the foundation of these decisions, Breihthaupt v. Abram, 352
U. S. 448 (1957), was based on Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U. S. 25 ( 1949), which was overruled in Mapp v. Ohio,
367

u. s.

643 (1961).

The respondents also cited several first amendment
cases where one could not work at certain jobs without
having his absolute freedom of speech limited. We need
not point out to the court that the very nature of free
expression, unlike search and seizure, requires a judicial
balancing process. E.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372, U. S. 539 (1963). Ever
since Justice Holmes first expressed the "clear and
present danger" test, we have realized over and over
that to allow someone to express his opinions without
restraint limits the freedom of choice of others. It is
because of this that the courts will not allow certain
individuals to advocate overthrow of our government
and still accept certain employment privileges from it.
The means of analysis used in freedom of expression
cases simply has not, and logically should not, be applied when an individual's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is involved. To grant one
individual immunity from an unreasonable search is
not going to limit another's immunity. We are not here
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concerned with the First Amendment, and no amount
of "privilege versus right" verbiage is going to occlude
the fact that th~ respondents here seek to impose a warrantless, unreasonable search upon the private premises
of certain, but not all, of its populace. The ordinance at
issue in Salt Lake City v. Wheeler, et al., supra, required
the same type of "consent" for the "privilege" of a
tavern license, and this court held that ordinance unconstitutional.
The respondents contend that all they have to do is
have something declared a "privilege," and not a
"right," and then they may legislate away all related
constitutional safeguards. The danger of this logic of
semantics is horribly obvious. We know that one cannot
shout " 'fire' in a crowded theater." Does this mean that
we have a right to some free speech and only a privilege to others? Where does the right end and the privilege begin? Every citizen has a right to associate freely
in the premises of his own private club. The respondents
would have us believe he does not, for secton 16-6-13.7
( 9) requires all members to consent to unreasonable
searches for the privilege of membership. Is it a privilege to have city fire, police, and garbage services? Why
not require that residents consent to all warrantless
searches for the privilege of living in a city?
No fancy words can obscure the bald-faced fact
that our constitution prohibits unreasonable searches;
yet, the instant statute permits them. Therefore, §166-13.7 Utah Code Ann. (1969) is unconstitutional
12
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and unenforceable because it is subordinate to and in
conflict with the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, which provides that the inhabitants of
this country are to be secure from unreasonable searches
and seizures.

POINT II
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF
LOCAL CONSENT RELATING TO THE
SALE OR DISPENSING OF INTOXICATING
LIQUORS IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
VAGUE BECAUSE NO STANDARDS, LIMITATIONS, OR GUIDELINES EXIST AS TO
HOW OR WHEN SUCH CONSENT IS TO BE
GRANTED, DENIED, SUSPENDED, OR
REVOKED.
The Utah Private Non profit Locker Clubs Act of
1969 contains many restrictions on where intoxicating
liquors may be stored, served and sold. One of these
requirements is that the local authorities must give
their written consent to the proposed use of any particular premises before this becomes legal. The following statutes refer to the necessity of this "local consent:"
§ 16-6-13.1 (6) Utah Code Ann. (1969):

Any social club, recreational, athletic, or ?ther
kindred association seeking to have a state hquor
store located on its premises, shall have a valid
license issued by the Utah liquor control com13
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mission, file a written application with the commission in t~e form prescribed, accompanied by
. . . the written consent of the local authority
as defined in the Utah Liquor Control Act of
1969 . . . .
§ 16-6-13.5 Utah Code Ann. (1969):

Subject to the provisions of this chapter and

th~ Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969 and regu-

lations promulgated thereunder, a Utah liquor
control commission, with consent of the local
authority, as defined in the Utah Liquor Control
act of 1969 shall have authority to issue a license
to a social club, recreational, athletic, or kindred
association, incorporated under the provisions of
this chapetr, which maintains or intends to maintain premises upon which liquor is or will be
stored, consumed or sold as hereinafter provided,
except that no license shall be issued to any club
or association which establishes or intends to establish such premises in the immediate proximity
of any existing school, church, library, public
playground or park.

It appears from the above statute that no club may
sell, serve, or allow storage and conswnption of liquor
on their premises without the consent of the local
authorities. The persons who have the authority to give
the consent for any particular locality are defined in
section 32-1-3 Utah Code Ann. (1969). That, however,
is as far as the legislature's guidelines on this requirement extend. There are no provisions of Utah law that
prescribe any standards, limitations, or guidelines to
be followed by the local authorities in granting, denying, suspending, or revoking their consent. In requiring
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l

this "local consent," the legislature left all such club:;
at the mercy of the local authority's whimsical discretion. This discretion remains completely unlimited to
this day; and in fact, no communities have even tried
to enact ordinances or otherwise notify the populace
as to what their local authorities will use as a standard
in determining if consent is to be given. The existence
of such a vague requirement precludes due process of
law and permits discriminatory and unequal treatment
of those similarly situated.
A vague local consent ordinance remarkably similar to the instant statute was held unconstitutional in the
landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356
(1886) . This early expression of the Supreme Court's
distaste of vague laws concerned the following San
Francisco ordinance :
It shall be unlawful, from and after the passage
of this order, for any person or persons to establish, maintain or carry on a laundry within the
corporate limits of the City and County of San
Francisco without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors ....

This ordinance was used by the local authorities to
discriminate against those of Chinese descent who were
in the laundry business. Since in Y ick W o there was evidence of actual discrimination the Court did not have to
decide the case on just the existence of a vague law.
However, even at that early date, the Court left no
doubt as to its reaction to laws that bytheir vagueness
grant unlimited discretion to administrative officials.

15
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For, the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or
any material right essential to the enjoyment
of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself. 118

u. s.

370.

Yick Wo clearly demonstrates how easy it is to unfairly administer a law similar to the statutes in question.
It is because of this potential for unequal treatment,
coupled with the lack of notice, that the Supreme Court
since Yick Wo has been so harsh on vague statutes. The
Court no longer waits for a vague law to be administered
unjustly. Time after time is has held such laws unconstitutional, concluding that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law." Connally v.
General Const. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 ( 1925) (cases
cited). The Court has considered the effect of vague
laws in practically all areas of the law and simply summarized its position by stating: "Vague laws in any
area suffer constitutional infirmity." Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, 200 {1966) (citing, International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216; Collins v.
Kentucky, 234 U. S. 634; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274
U. S. 445; Smith v. Ca;hoon, 283 U. S. 553; Champlin
Refining Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210; Lanzetta v.
16
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New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451; Wright v. Georgia, 373
U. S. 284; Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399. Cf.
Scull v. Virginia, 359 U. S. 344; Raley v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 423.) (Emphasis added.).
The absence of standards or guidelines to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory treatment has been the
precise reason for the Supreme Court to conclude a
statute unconstitutionally vague. In Giaccio v. State of
Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 401 (1966), a state statute
authorized juries to impose at their discretion, and without standards or guidelines, the cost of criminal prosecution of the defendant. The Court's opinion in holding
this statute unconstitutional is set out at length below:
We agree with the trial court and the dissenting judges in the appellate courts below th~t
the 1860 Act is invalid under the Due Process
Clause because of vagueness and the absence
of any standards sufficient to enable defendants
to protect themselves against arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of costs . . . . Both liberty and property are specifically protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment against any state
deprivation which does not meet the standards
of due process, and this protection is not to be
avoided by the simple label a State chooses to
fasten upon its conduct or its statute. So here
this state Act whether labeled "penal" or not
must meet the challenge that it is unconstitutio~
ally vague. It is established that a law fails to
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause
if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves
the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits
or leaves judges and jurors free to decide with-
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out any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited
and what is not in each particular case. See, e.g.,
LanzBtta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,
59 S. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888; Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U. S. 360, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 12 L. Ed. ~d 377.
This 1860 Pennsylvania Act contains no standards at all, nor does it place any conditions of
any kind upon the jury's power to impose costs
upon a defendant who has been found by the
jury to be not guilty of a crime charged against
him. The Act, without imposing a single condition, limitation or contingency on a jury which
has acquitted a defendant simply says the jurors
"shall determine, by their verdict, whether * * *
the defendant shall pay the costs" whereupon the
trial judge is told he "shall forthwith pass sentence to that effect, and order him [defendant]
to be committed to the jail of the county" there
to remain until he either pays or gives security
for the costs. Certainly one of the basic purposes
of the Due Process Clause has always been to
protect a person against having the Governll!ent
impose burdens upon him except in accordance
with the valid laws of the land. Implicit in this
constitutional safeguard is the premise that the
law must be one that carries an understandable
meaning with legal standards that courts must
enforce. This state Act as written does not even
begin to meet this constitutional requirement.
The total absence of guidelines that made the statute in Giaccio unconstitutionally vague is just as obvious
in the Utah statutes. The Utah Legislature stated absolutely no standards, nor did it place any conditions or
limitations of any kind on the power of the local authorities to grant their consent to one applicant and withhold
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it from another. It was precisely this kind of unlimited
discretion that was held unconstitutional in Giaccio.

This Court has also held laws which give unguided
discretion to some administrative unit invalid. This type
of law has usually been treated in Utah as an unlawful
delegation of power, which is often just another way of
saying that due process is denied. When a statute or
ordinance grants the power to some administrative unit
to determine its action by the facts found, it grants a
"quasi-judicial" power (State Ta.x Comm'n of Utah v.
Katsis, 90 Utah 406, 413, 62 P. 2d 120 (1936)); and
whenever power of a judicial character is exercised, the
requirements of due process must be enforced.
In Jones v. Logan City, 19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P.
2d 160 ( 1967) , this Court struck down an ordinance that
imposed upon an administrative unit "quasi-judicial"
functions without standards or guidelines to govern it.
In that case the law in question permitted the local board
of condemnation to declare what a public nuisance was
without any restrictions or limitations on the board's
discretion. Aware that to uphold such an ordinance
would deny due process, this court stated:
Ordinance No. 120 above referred to, which
grants to the Board of Condemnation the right
to determine whether any building constitutes
a menace to public health or public safety does
not provide standards on which the Board can
base its finding as to what is or what is not a
menace to public health or public safety. It
would appear that the ordinance imposes upon
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the Board of Condemnation quasi-judicial functions without standards or guidelines to govern
the Board in its determination. [People ex rel.
Gamber v. Sholem, 294 Ill. 204, 128 N. E. 377,
378; State v. Keller, 108 Neb. 742, 189 N. W.
374, 25 A. L. R. 115; Rowland v. State ex rel.
Martin, 129 Fla. 662, 176 So. 545, 114 A. L. R.
443 and annotations p. 446.} We are of the
opinion that the ordinance attempts to make an
unlawful delegation of power to the City's Board
of Condemnation. We are of the opinion that by
reason of the delegation of powers by the City
Commission the ordinance above referred to is
invalid. [State Tax Commission of Utah v.
J(atsis, 90 Utah 406, 62 P. 2d 120, 107 A. L. R.
1477.]
The delegatioin of power to local authorities to
allow or prevent the otherwise legal use of any particular premises must be held an unlawful delegation of
power for the same reason that the ordinance in Jones
was held unlawful. In Jones there were no standards to
guide the board of condemnation in its determination of
nuisances and here there are no standards to guide the
local authorities in their determination of consent. In
this instance the local officials are granted a quasi-judicial function, for the legislature obviously intended that
they assess the facts and determine their action by the
facts. To assume otherwise would be to assume the legislature intended that local authority grant, deny, suspend, or revoke an uninformed and capricious consent.
Therefore, local consent is not a mere ministerial function, and there must be legislative guidelines which
meet constitutional standards. State Tax Comm'n of
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Utah v. f(atsis, supra. In granting to executive officials
the power to exercise their discretion over the property
rights of others, due process demands that this discretion be limited. The statutes in question confer a pronounced power on the local authorities to grant, deny,
suspend, or revoke property rights to others. This delegation of power is unlimited and, therefore, unconstitutional. These statutes must be held invalid and unenforceable.
Finally, Utah Const. art. I, § 24 demands that:
"all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." This provision, in addition to the requirement of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, is a safeguard against any laws in Utah that
permit discriminatory application. .Abrahamsen v.
Board of Review of Industrial Comm'n, 3 Utah 2d 289,
283 P. 2d 213 ( 1955) ; State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78
p. 2d 920 ( 1938) .
In the instant case, the legislature has passed a general law to regulate where liquor may be stored, served,
consumed, and sold within the state. Yet, all of these
determinations are dependent upon the unlimited discretion of each of the 231 local authorities within the
State of Utah. The legislature provided no means to
insure any uniform operation of these laws of a general
nature.
The practical effect of granting this power to local
officials without any guidelines or standards is to let the
personal whims of these officials determine the law's

21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

application. It is easy to assume that this grant of power
could result in left-handed prohibition in certain communities simply because the local authorities choose not
to give their consent to anybody. "In the beginning" of
these 1969 liquor laws, this actually happened in Utah
County which even now is limited to but one such consent having been given to the Alpine Country Club.
Where like results are not evidenced, the fact remains
that what one official in one community will look for,
another in a different community will not. There is
nothing to prevent one official from using totally arbitrary and invidious reasons for granting, denying, suspending, or revoking consent, or to prevent inconsistent,
arbitrary, and invidious discrimination.
If the legislature intended to have prohibition or
local option, it would have so provided. As it is, the
power it vested in the local authorities not only results
in a form of local option, but also precludes the uniform
application of the Private Nonprofit Locker Clubs Act
of 1969. Therefore, these statutes are also in violation
of Utah Const. art: I, § 24, as well as in violation of U.
S. Const. amends. V and XIV.
POINT III
§ § 16-6-13.1 AND 16-6-13.5 UTAH CODE ANN.

(1969) DENY DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN

THAT NO HEARINGS ARE PROVIDED FOR
IN THE GRANTING, DENYING, SUSPENDING, OR REVOKING OF LOCAL CONSENT;
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NOR ARE ANY HEARINGS PROVIDED FOR
THE GRANTING OR DENYING OF A LICENSE BY THE UTAH STATE LIQUOR
CONTROL COMMISSION.
and 16-6-13.1 Utah Code Ann.
(1969) (quoted in Point II of this brief) authorize
three crucial administrative determinations as to whether
a private club will obtain and keep a state liquor license.
~ 16-6-13.5 authorizes the Utah State Liquor Control
Commission to license these clubs with several conditions, and one of the conditions, as set forth in both § ~
16-6-13.5 and 16-6-13.1 Utah Code Ann. (1969), is
that the club have the consent of the local authorities to
operate in the local area. Reading §§ 16-6-13.1 and 166-13.5 Utah Code Ann. ( 1969) together, it becomes
clear that three distinct administrative proceedings may
take place that substantially affect the property rights
of the clubs and their members. These proceedings are:
first, the granting or denying of local consent; second,
the granting or denying of a license; and third, the suspension or revocation of local consent. All three of these
administrative determinations take place without any
kind of a hearing. Here we have governmental agencies
making binding determinations as to the property rights
of others without even the most basic of procedural safeguards. This practice denies due process of law.
§§ 16-6-13.5

The most definitive statement on the requirements
of due process in administrative procedure is the United
States Supreme Court case of Hawnah v. Larche, 363
C. S. 420 (1960). The often-quoted rule for determin-
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ing when due process procedures are necessary is found
on page 442 of the majority's opinion:
Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate
or make binding determinations which directly
affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures
which have traditionally been associated with
the judicial process. On the other hand, when
governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example, when a general factfinding investigation is being conducted, it is
not necessary that the full panoply of judicial
procedure be used.
If an administrative body acts other than as a fact
finder, i.e., if it finds facts and makes a determination
based on them, its action takes on a quasi-judicial nature
and the necessity of procedural safeguards attaches.
Although some justices believe the scope of procedural safeguards in administrative actions should be
much broader than in Hannaih, (see the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Douglas in Hannah v.
Larche, supra, and their concurring opinions in Jenkins
v. McKeithen, infra) the Court recently reaffirmed this
rule while declaring the practices of the Louisiana
Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry in violation
of due process. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411
(1969). In Jenkins, the state statute authorized an administrative agency to do more than just gather facts to
aid legislation. Rather, it allowed the agency to make its
own determination of guilt and "brand individuals" in
the eyes of the publie. 395 U. S. at 427-28. Since the act
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that provided the agency with this power also limited
the right of cross-examination and the presentation of
evidence in one's own behalf, the Court concluded that
due process was violated, and the statute was unconstitional. 395 U. S. at 428-32.
A case very analogous to the present one was decided by this court in Morris v. Public Service Comm'n,
7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P. 2d 644 (1958). In that case, Appellant Watson had a certificate of convenience and
necessity to operate as a common carrier, and he wanted
to have it transferred to Appellant Morris by the usual
procedure of having the Utah State Public Service
Commission issue Morris a new certificate and revoke
his old one. The commission had a hearing at which both
appellants were present for the sole purpose of deciding
whether or not they should grant Morris the operating
rights of Watson. After the hearing the commission not
only denied the application to Morris, but it revoked
Watson's existing certificate. This court, in overturning
both decisions, concluded that Watson had never had
notice or a proper hearing to determine the revocation of
this pro,perty right and, therefore, he was denied due
process of law.
The legislature has recognized the value of a liquor
license and that procedural safeguards are just as important to this property right as they are in the type of
property right involved in Morris. § 16-6-13.11 Utah
Code Ann. ( 1969) requires a public hearing before the
liquor control commission may revoke, refuse to renew,
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or suspend for more than thirty days any license that it
issues. The legislature, however, overlooked the fact that
since no hearings were required for the granting of local
consent, this procedural safeguard could be circumvented. The local authorities have interpreted §§ 16-6-13.1
and 16-6-13.5 Utah Code Ann. ( 1969) to mean that
they may whimsically revoke their consent, as well as
grant it, and the liquor control commission considers any
revocation of local consent conclusive grounds for license revocation. What good is the public hearing provided by § 16-6-13.11 Utah Code Ann. (1969) if the
only issue involved has been conclusively decided by a
subordinate agency without a hearing?
The legislature also overlooked the necessity of a
hearing for the liquor control commission's determination of whether or not to grant a license. The property
value of a liquor license is no less when it is being granted
than it is when it is being revoked. To be logically consistent, the legislature should have required a hearing
whenever a determination of a club's license application
is to be made. Of course, to satisfy the requirements of
due process, a hearing must be held.
When a statute or ordinance grants the power to
some administrative unit to determine its action by the
facts found by that administrative unit, that statute or
ordinance grants a "quasi-judicial" power. State Ta.i:
Comm'n of Utah v. Katsis, 90 Utah 406, 413, 62 P. ~
120 ( 1936) . This is the same power expressed in Hannah v. Larche, supra, as the power of a governmental
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1

agency to "adjudicate or make binding determinations
which directly affect the legal rights of others."
When local officials consent to a certain club's application for a liquor license, or revoke such consent, and
when the liquor control commission decides to grant or
deny a license to any particular club, a binding determination of a judicial nature is made. When an agency
has this quasi-judicial function the most basic of procedural safeguards must be required. An applicant must
be able to present his own case and confront the witnesses against him.

and 16-6-13.5 Utah Code Ann.
( 1969) permit administrators to sit behind closed doors
and make these crucial determinations without the individual most affected by their decision even being able
' to know their reasons, let alone present his case. This is
not due process of law.
§§ 16-6-13.l

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully contended that the summary judgment against appellants
be reversed and §§ 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.5, and 16-6-13.7
Utah Code Ann. ( 1969) and all other interrelated sec-
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tions of the Private Nonprofit Locker Clubs Act of
1969 and the Liquor Control Act of 1969 be declared unconstitutional, void, and unenforceable.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
410 Empire Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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